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This is a desperate case. Assume that a lawyer has been assigned to defend the killer and she needs to
discover evidence that will help her make an argument to defeat the charges against the defendant or that
will help her seek mitigation at sentencing if the defendant is convicted. The lawyer is aware of the Caspi
and colleagues (2002) study and its later replications that found a vastly increased risk for criminal
behavior among males who had been subject to severe abuse as children and who had a genetic defect
that caused an monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) deficiency. The lawyer is easily able to confirm from family
members, teachers, and neighbors that the robber was severely abused as a child, and a genetic analysis
confirms that the robber also has the specific defect associated with increased risk for crime..."
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CHAPTER II

Gene-Environment Interactions,
Criminal Responsibility,
and Sentencing
Stephen J. Morse

Imagine :1 defendant who has been charged with murder, the intentional
homicide of a victim he was robbing with a weapon. He has a history of
three previous convictions and imprisonments for armed robbery. Prior to
being released from the third term, he publicly threatened to kill any fmure
armed robbery victims who might be able to identify him. When the cur~
rent victim looked our armed robber in the eye, the robber said to the victim, "You looked the wrong way at the wrong guy," pulled the trigger, and
killed the victim. (We know this because his accomplice has turned state's
evidence and, unbeknownst to the robber, there was a witness who will
corroborate the accomplice's evidence.)
This is a desperate case. Assume that a lawyer has been assigned to
defend the killer and she needs to discover evidence that will help her make
an argument to defeat the charges against the defendant or that will help
her seek mitigation at sentencing if the defendant is convicted. The lawyer
is aware of the Caspi and colleagues (2002) study and its later replications
that found a vastly increased risk for criminal behavior among males who
had been subject to severe abuse as children and who had a genetic defect
Ithat caused an monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) deficiency. The lawyer is
easily able to confirm from family members, teachers, and neighbors that
the robber was severely abused as a child, and a genetic analysis confirms
that the robber also has the specific defect associated with increased risk
Ifor crime.
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The question is whether the presence of this well-studied and mostly
well-confirmed gene-environment interaction (G x E) is relevant to SUPPOrt
claims on behalf of the armed robber or the prosecution at trial or senrenc~
mg.
The case just described is not simply hypothetical. An Jralian judge
recently reduced a convicted murderer's sentence on the ground that the
killer was predisposed to be particularly aggressive in stressful situations
because he had the same MAOA deficiency studied by Caspi and colleagues
(Feresin, 2009). There have also been a small number of U.S. cases in which ,
such evidence has been introduced (Bernet, Venecak-Jones, Farahany, &
Montgomery, 2007; Denno, 2009). It is seldom explained why a genetically driven predisposition justifies a sentence teduction. Various experts
criticized the Italian's judge's decision. evertheless, the use of G x E for
making decisions about criminal responsibility and sentencing will surely
increase. The question for the law is what the relevance of such explanations of behavior might be. For example, does a G x E suggest that the
hypothetical murder defendant has diminished culpability or enhanced
dangerousness? Was the Italian judge justified in reducing the murderer's
sentence based on genetic predisposition?
My task in this chapter is to consider the relevance of G x E to criminal responsibility and sentencing. I begin with a number of preliminary
assumptions that will inform the analysis. I then turn to the law's view
of the person, including the law's implicit psychology, and the criteria for:
criminal responsibility. False starts and distractions about responsibility
are addressed next. This section explains in detail why arguments based on
free will and causation that are rooted in scientific explanations of crime, t
including G x E, do not have the implications for criminal responsibilitY' <
that proponents often claim.
}:
The extended discussion of the foregoing topics is necessary before one:',
can even begin to consider the relation between G x E (or any other causalt,'
variable) to criminal responsibility and sentencing. With this necessar~,
background in place, I then turn specifically to the relation between G x E~
and criminal responsibility. I next address sentencing and consider whethe
G x E is relevant to mitigation and aggravation. I conclude by considering
briefly how knowledge of G x E might otherwise influence criminal justic .
policy and practice.
1 claim that G x E causes of criminal behavior have no relation to eu
rent conceptions of responsibility per se, but they may be relevant to cnlp
bility if valid research discloses an association between G x E and a gen
ine excusing or mitigating condition. Thus, although G x E is unlikely t~
have a major transformative effect on responsibility doctrines and praetic
unless it transforms basic conceptions of human agency, it may well playa
important role in the adjudication of individual cases. I also propose that '"

,,
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x E is likely to play its largest role in criminal justice at sentencing. I suggest
that the same considerations governing responsibility ascriptions apply to
sentencing mitigation and that the prediction of future dangerousness will
be a common sentencing application for aggravation and mitigation.

PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTIONS

Genes, environments, and their interactions do not commit crimes; acting
people commit crimes. We do not praise and reward or blame and punish
G x Ej these are attitudes and actions we direct at people. Bedazzled by the
newest scientific findings in behavioral genetics, neuroscience, and other
rapidly advancing disciplines, we often forget this simple truth about our
actual social and legal practices of praising and blaming, rewarding and
punishing. Unless we cease to treat each other as acting agents) as persons,
no major alteration of these practices is likely to result.
G x E raises no new issues about criminal responsibility or the prediction of future dangerousness that have not been raised previously by other
alleged causal explanations for crime, such as social structural explanations, psychodynamic and behavioral psychological explanations, genetic
explanations, and neuroscientin.c explanations. Such explanations allegedly prove the truth of determinism, but as the chapter later shows, determinism is not inconsistent with criminal responsibility. Similarly, many
people think that discovery of a causal explanation, such as G x E, is per se
excusing or mitigating, but this is not the case, as the chapter also explains.
Again, unless a causal explanation threatens human agency, which G x E
does not purport to do, the basic structure of criminal responsibility and
punishment is not likely to change substantially. G x E may affect the adjudication of individual cases and sentencing decisions, but it is unlikely to
lead to major changes.
The basic questions for the law are always the same. What is the rel~
'evance of this causal information to legal doctrine and practice? Does the
'evidence seem to suggest the need for radical, fundamental restructuring
or reform of law or for more limited, discrete reforms, if any, of particular
doctrine or practices. Advocates often tend to make overclaims based on
science (Morse, 2006), but experience indicates that most of what we learn
suggests no major overhaul of law.
Human behavior is generally the product of immensely complex factors that include biological, psychological, and sociological variables.
Human beings are fundamentally biological machines that always interact
with their environments (Noe, 2009). In particular, G x E is surely part
ohhe explanation of many and perhaps most behaviors. Although this is
true, human beings are a special type of causal end product of the inter-
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action between biology and environment. Our unique capacities, such as
our ability [0 use fully developed propositional language and our ability
to deliberate about what we have reason to do, have enormous moral and
legal implications.
It is important to stress that responsibility is a distinguishable issue
from prophylactic or rehabilitative concerns. Even if particular scientific ~.
knowledge has no bearing on responsibility, it may well have implications
for the ex ante (i.e., before the fact) prevention of undesirable behavior, the
ex POSt (i.e., after the fact) prevention of recidivism, the control of predictably dangerous people, and the promotion of desirable behavior.
Criminal responsibility and its consequences, such as whether and
how much to punish a wrongdoer, are normative moral, political, and ultimately legal questions. They address how we should live together. Empirical discoveries about behavior can make profound contributions to debates ..
about what we have reason to do, but they do nOt by themselves dictate any
normative conclusion. On the ultimate issue of how we should live, science
must fall silent because how we should live is a matter of practical and not
theoretical reason (but see Harris, 2010, for a contrary argument). The
issue is normative and not factual.
Finally, and with few exceptions, retribution-giving people their just
deserts-is a necessary precondition for blame and punishment in the U.S.
criminal justice system and it plays a role in all developed Western legal systems. Most criminal justice theorists justify punishment on mixed retribn.
tive and consequential grounds. Consequential concerns do matter to th
definition of crimes and to the appropriate sentence to be imposed, but U.S.1
and Western criminal justice systems agree that no one should be punished.,;,
unless he or she deserves it and no more than he or she deserves. Retribu
tion is a well-recognized justification for the state infliction of pain on it
citizens and it must be distinguished from revenge, with which it is ofte
confused. Revenge is the primitive desire to hurt those who have hurt you
It usually involves anger and often includes psychological catharsis. Retri
bution, in contrast, is a theory of justice. There are many different accoun
of retribution, but all agree that it is a good in itself to give people wha
they morally and legally deserve. It is nOt a primitive and prescientific for .
of human response, but a considered theory of justice. Blaming and punis
ing people for wronging others because they deserve such a response is •
mirror image of praising and rewarding people for helping others becaus
they deserve such a response. Accepting a retributive theory of punishmen
does not entail whether or how much criminals should be punished. 0
could be permissive or obligatory about whether retribution demands p
ish me nt, and a retriburivist can be harsh or tender about how much punis
ment is deserved. The only basic commitment is that people should not
punished unless they deserve it and then no more than they deserve.
"r-
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THE LAW'S PSYCHOLOGY
AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

The law-anyway a reification-has not explicitly adopted any psychology
or concept of the person. What follows is a rational reconstruction of the
criminal law's implicit psychology and concept of the person and why these
are necessary if law is to make coherent sense and to serve a useful function
in society.
Lawyers take the criminal law's implicit psychology for granted
because there is seldom any need to identify or question it. G x E and other
scientific findings may appear to call the law's psychology into question,
however, so it is crucial consciously to recognize it and to understand what
would be entailed if it were undermined.
Criminal law presupposes the "folk psychological" view of the person
and behavior. This psychological theory causally explains behavior in part
by mental ~tates such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans.
Biological, other psychological, and sociological variables also playa role,
but folk psychology considers mental states fundamental to a full explanation of human action. Human behavior cannot be adequately understood if
mental state causation is completely excluded or eliminated. Lawyers, philosophers, and scientists do of course argue about the definitions of mental
states and about theories of mind and action, but that does not undermine
the general claim that mental states are fundamental to law. Indeed, the
arguments and evidence disputants use to convince others itself presupposes the folk psychological view of the person. Brains don't convince each
other; people do.
For example, the folk psychological explanation for why you are reading this chapter is, roughly, that you desire to understand the relation of
G x E to criminal responsibility and sentencing, you believe that reading
the chapter will help fulfill that desire, and thus you formed the intention
to read it. This is a "practical" explanation rather than a deductive syllogism.
Folk psychology does not presuppose the truth of free will (which will
be discussed further below), it is not dualist (although it, and ordinary
.speech, sound that way), it is perfectly consistent with the truth of determinism, and it presupposes no particular moral or political view. It does not
presuppose that all mental states are necessarily conscious or that people
go through a conscious decision-making process each time that they act. It
allows for "thoughtless," automatic, and habitual actions, and for nonconcious intentions. For example, consider the behavior of putting on your
! ndershorts in the morning. You probably have not considered which leg to
put through first since you learned to dress yourself. There is no decision;
the behavior is utterly automatic and habitual. This makes sense because
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there is no reason to give any thought to which leg goes first. Absolutely
nothing turns on this. Suppose, however, that you had good reason [Q pUt
the other leg first, say, a threat to kill you if you pur the usual leg through
first. You would then bring thrs automatic behavior under the control of
reason. This example is an illustration of folk psychology's presupposition
that human action will at least be rarionalizable by mental state explanations or that it wiJl be responsive to reasons, including incentives, under the
right conditions.
The definition of folk psychology this chapter uses does not depend On
the truth of any particular bit of folk wisdom about how people are motivated, feel, or ac[, Any of these bits, such as that experiencing disrespect
often produces anger, might turn out to be wrong after further empirical
investigation. The definition insists only that human action is in part caus.
ally explained by mental states.
Consider the criteria for criminal responsibility. The prosecution must
first prove the "elements" of the crime, which is simply the legal term for
the criteria for criminal conduct. These elements are composed primarily
of acts and mental states. All are infused with mental states. All crimes
include a "voluntary" act requirement, which is defined, roughly, as an
intentional bodily movement (or an omission in cases in which the person
has a duty to act) done while the agent is in a reasonably integrated state of
consciousness. Although the meaning of an intentional bodily movement is
seldom specified, the best definition is a bodily movement that in principle
can be understood according to the person's mental state. One can almost
always ask of any act, "Why did you do that?," and expect some explicit
or implicit mental explanation. If there is none even implicitly possible,
it is probable that the agent's bodily movement was nor an act ar all. For
example, reflexes and neuromuscular spasms involve bodily movements.,
but they are not acrions because they were nor intentional bodily move- r
ments and cannor respond to reasons or incentives.
With few exceptions that are themselves controversial, all crimes alsg
require a culpable further mental state, such as purpose, knowledge, o~
conscious awareness that one is risking a prohibited harm (a mental state
lawyers call "recklessness"). Some crimes are also defined with the men
state of negligence, which is defined as an unreasonable failure to be awa~
of rhe risk of a prohibited harm. Negligence appears to be rhe absence of
mental state. This is a controversial issue among legal scholars, bur the
explanation for criminalizing negligence is that the failure to pay arrenrio
when rhe agent was creating a substantial and unjustifiable level of risk ~
itself a rype of culpable omission. On the other hand, some scholars belie."
thar negligence is an insufficiently culpable mental state to supporr cr· .
liability.
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To make this discussion more concrete) consider the following srandard definition of murder mentioned in the opening hypothetical about the
homicidal armed robber: killing another human being with the intent to
cause death. Any intentional killing conduct-for example) shooting, stabbing, strangling) poisoning) or bludgeoning-is sufficient to meet the act
requirement as long as the agent was in a state of reasonably integrated consciousness when engaging in the killing conduct. Furthermore, the agent
must engage in the conduct with the intent to cause death. If the agent
lacked that intent and, say, just risked killing the victim, then the agem will
not be guilty of intentional murder, but may be guilty of some other homicide crime that requires a different mental state.
Even if the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of crime) the
defendant may still avoid criminal liability by successfully establishing
what is called an affirmative defense of justification or excuse. In cases
of justification, conduct that would otherwise be criminal is right or at
least permissible under the circumstances. Self-defense is a classic example. Intentionally killing another human being is ordinarily murder, but an
agent may be justified in killing if the other person is threatening the agent
with wrongful, deadly force. In such cases) intentional killing is considered
right or at least permissible. Note that in cases of justification, the agent is
a fully responsible person.
In contrast, cases of excuse involve wrongful action performed by an
I agent who is not responsible. Roughly speaking) lack of rational capacity,
external compulsion (e.g., acting in response to a "do-it-or-else" threat
of death or grievous bodily injury) and, more controversially, lack of the
capacity to control oneself (sometimes referred to as "internal compulsion")
are the basic grounds for criminal law's doctrinal excuses. Note that in the
cases of lack of rational capacity or lack of the capacity to control oneself)
. responsibility requires only the possession of the general capacity at the time
in question, even if the agent did not exercise the capacity on that occasion.
For example, acting irrationally) arationally, and foolishly are common even
among people with the greatest capacity for rational conduct. Failure to
exercise a capacity does not necessarily mean that one lacks that capacity.
For the law, if the person is capable of exercising the capacity for rationality or self-control if there is good reason to do so-as there always is when
important interests of potential victims are at stake-then the person may
be held responsible even if he or she failed to exercise that capacity.
If the person lacks the relevant capacity, an excuse is warranted. Legal
insanity is a classic example. Suppose a person delusionally believes thar he
Or she is about to be killed by a secret agent and kills the suspected secret
agent in what the person believes is self-defense. The person has wrongfully
killed intentionally) but he or she would be excused because he or she was

I
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not a rational agent when he or she killed. In a very real sense, the killer did
not know what he or she was doing.
All affirmative defenses involve an inquiry into the person's mental
state, such as the person's belief that self-defensive force was necessary or
his or her lack of knowledge of what he or she was doing or that what he Or
she was doing was wrong.
In shorr, criminal responsibility is established if the prosecution can
prove all the elements of the crime charged and the defendant cannot estab.
fish an affirmative defense. Criminal responsibility is defeated if the pros.
ecurion cannot prove all the elements of the crime charged or if the defen.
dane can establish an affirmative defense. The elements and affirmative
defenses all involve mental states. Of course the person's mental state is
influenced by biological, psychological, and sociological variables, including G x E, and knowledge of these variables may help determine what the
person's mental state was. Nevertheless, the law is ultimately concerned
with the person as an acting agent who has acted for reasons. The final
explanatory pathway for criminal law is always folk psychological (directly
or indirectly). Any relevant data from G x E or other sciences must be translated into the law's folk psychological criteria.
We will turn to the relation of G x E to criminal law's responsibility
criteria below. Before doing so, however, I describe why the law's psychology must be folk psychology and will briefly discuss some false starts and
distractions about responsibility.

J

I
THE INEVITABILITY OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY IN LAW

Brief reflection should indicate rhat the law's psychology must be a folk
psychological theory, a view of the person as a conscious (and potentiallYl
self-conscious) creature who forms and acts on intentions that are th .
product of the person's other mental states, such as desires, beliefs, will=«.
ings, and plans. Law is primarily action guiding (Sher, 2006) and could noti,
guide people ex ante and ex post unless people could use rules as premise~
in their reasoning about how they should behave. Otherwise, law as a .
action-guiding, normative system of rules would be useless, and perhaps
incoherent. Law is a system of rules that, at the least, is meant to guide o·
influence behavior and thus to operate as a potential cause of behavior. A
philosopher John Searle (2002) wrore:

•

Once we have the possibility of explaining particular forms of human
behavior as following rules, we have a very rich explanatory apparatus
that differs dramatically from the explanatory apparatus of the natural sciences. When we say we are following rules, we are accepting the
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notion of mental causation and the attendant notions of rationality and
existence of norms.... The content of the rule does not just describe
what is happening, but plays a part in making it happen. (p. 35)

Legal rules are not simply mechanistic causes that produce "reflex"
compliance, although they can certainly help to inculcate law-abiding
«habits." They operate within the domain of folk psychology. Agents are
meant to and can only use these rules as potential reasons for action as
they decide about what they should do. Legal rules are thus action guiding
primarily because they provide an agent with good moral or prudential
reasons for forbearance or action.
Unless people are capable of understanding and then using legal rules
to guide their conduct, law would be powerless to affect human behavior
(Shapiro, 2000). Law can directly and indirectly affect the world we inhabit
only by it~ influence on human beings who can potentially use legal rules to
guide conduct. For example, no "instinct" governs how fast a person drives
on the open highway. Among the variables that explain the speed at which
a person drives, the posted speed limit and the belief in the probability of
suffering the consequences for exceeding it surely playa large role in the
driver's choice of speed. The law thus guides action.
Human behavior can be modified by means other than influencing
deliberation, and human beings do nOt always deliberate before they act.
Nonetheless, the law presupposes folk psychology, even when we most
habitually follow the legal rules. All citizens constantly act in the "shadow
of the law," especially when criminal conduct is at stake.
The legal view of the person does not hold that people muSt always
reason or consistently behave rationally according to some preordained,
normative notion of rationality. Rather the law's view is that people are
capable of acting for reasons and are capable of minimal rationality according to predominantly conventional, socially constructed standards. The
type of rationality the law requires is the ordinary person's commonsense
view of rationality, not the technical notion that might be acceptable within
. the disciplines of economics, philosophy, psychology, computer science,
~ and the like.
Virrually everything for which agents deserve to be praised, blamed,
rewarded, or punished is the product of mental causation, and, in principle,
responsive to reason. I do not mean to imply dualism here. I am simply
accepting the folk psychological view that mental states-which are fully
produced by and realizable in the brain-playa genuinely causal role in
explaining human behavior. Machines may cause harm, but they cannot
do wrong and they cannot violate expectations about how people ought to
live together. Machines do nor deserve praise, blame, reward, punishment,
concern, or respect because they exist or because of the results they cause.
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Only people, intentional agents with the potential [0 act, can violate expec_
tations of what they owe each other and only people can do wrong.
Many scientists and some philosophers of mind and action consider
folk psychology to be a primitive or prescientific view of human behavior.
No one, however, has even remotely suggested a replacement psychology for
the law that would conceivably be practical-and law is an intensely practi.
cal enterprise. For the foreseeable future, then, the law will be based on the
folk psychological model of the person and behavior, and this chapter wilt
proceed on that premise. Until and unless scientific discoveries convince us
that our view of ourselves is radically wrong-and nothing science has dis~
covered begins to suppor[ this claim (Morse, 2008)-the basic explanatory
apparatus of folk psychology will remain central. The folk psychological
theory of personhood that the law implicitly adopts seems secure. As eminent philosopher of mind Jerry Fodor (1987) has written:
If commonsense intentional psychology were really to collapse, that
would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in
the history of OUf speciesj if we're that wrong ahom the mind, then that's
the wrongest we've ever been about anything. The collapse of the supernatural, for example, doesn't compare.... Nothing except, perhaps, OUf
commonsense physics ... comes as near our cognitive core as intentional

explanation does. We'll be in deep, deep trouble if we have to give it
up.... But be of good cheer; everything is going to be all right. (p. xii)
It is vital that we nOt lose sight of the folk psychological model lest
we fall into confusion when various claims based on G x E or other ca~sal
variables are made. Once again, any G x E data or evidence must always
be relevant to the law's folk psychological criteria. If G x E is to have any
influence on legal decisions about criminal responsibility and sentencing, it
must be almost entirely through this framework.

DISTRACTIONS AND FALSE STARTS
IN CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSIS

In this section of the chapter I consider the following distractions that have I
bedeviled attempts to understand the relation between scientific expJana-'
tions for criminal behavior and criminal responsibility: the free will debate,
the belief that causation is pet se an excusing condition, the belief that cau~
sation by abnormal variables is per se an excusing condition, and the belief
that causation is the equivalent of compulsion. Many of the arguments i~,
this section probably will be unfamiliar to many scientists, bur they are ccu;:
cial to proper understanding and therefore deserve careful consideration.~·
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The Non-Problem of Free Will in Criminal Law
There is a problem about free will, but not in criminal law (Morse, 2007).
Free will, as the term is used in the philosophical debate about free will and
responsibility, is not a criterion for any legal doctrine. Criminal law crite~
ria involve questions genuinely related to responsibility, including issues
concerning consciousness, the formation of mental states such as intention.
and knowledge, the capacity for rationality, and compulsion, but they never
address the presence or absence of free will. People sometimes use "free
will" loosely to refer to genuine responsibility doctrines, but this simply
distracts attention from the real issues and perpetuates confusion.
The philosophical problem of free will is metaphysical and often clouds
clear thinking about the foundation for criminal responsibility. Specialists
in the philosophy of free will and responsibility often distinguish between
freedom of action, the freedom to do as one chooses, and freedom of the
will, the freedom to choose what one would prefer to choose (Kane, 2006).
This chapter will subsume both under the locution "freedom of the will"
or "free will."
Roughly, the notion of free will used in the debate refers to whether
an agent has the ability to cause his or her own behavior uncaused by anything else. In a phrase, the buck stops entirely with the agent. This ability
is sometimes called contra-causal freedom, agent origination, metaphysical
libertarianism, and other like phrases. Only a small number of philosophers adhere to this view, which has been termed a "panicky" metaphysics
(P. F. Strawson, 1980, p. 80) because it is so implausible (Bok, 1998).
Even if this type of free will is not a criterion for any criminal law doctrine, many people nonetheless believe that this type of power or ability is a
foundational assumption for legal responsibility and for justifying the fair
imposition of blame and punishment. Thus, if people do not possess this
god-like power, then doctrines and practices relating to responsibility may
be entirely incoherent. But, as we shall see, contra~causal freedom is not a
necessary support for current responsibility doctrines and practices.
Most philosophers and, I speculate, virtually all scientists, believe that
the universe is deterministic or universally caused, or nearly so, especially
above the subatomic level. There is no unconrroversial definition of determinism and we will never be able to confirm that it is true or not. As a
working definition, however, let us assume, roughly, that all events have
causes that operate according to the physical laws of the universe and that
were themselves caused by those same laws operating on prior states of the
universe in a continuous thread of causation going back to the first state.
Even if this is too strong, the universe seems so sufficiently regular and
lawful that rationality demands that we assume that universal causation is
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approximately correct. Philosopher G. Strawson (1989) terms this assump_
tion the "reality constraint."
It is important to understand that, for the determinist, biological
causes, including interactions of biology with the environment, pose no
more or less challenge to responsibility than nonbiological or social causes.
As a conceptual and empirical matter, we do nOt necessarily have more control over psychological or social causal variables than over biological causal
variables. More important, in a world of universal causation or determinism, causal mechanisms are indistinguishable in this respect and biological
causation creates no greater threat to our life hopes than psychological Or
social causation (Richards, 2000). For purposes of the metaphysical free
will debate, a cause is just a cause, whether it is biological, psychological,
sociological, or astrological.
If determinism is true, the people we are and the actions we perform
have been caused by a chain of causation over which we mostly had no
rational comrol and for which we could not possibly be responsible. We
do not have contra-causal freedom. How can responsibility be possible for
action or for anything else in such a universe? How can it be rational and
fair for criminal law to hold anyone accountable for anything, including
blaming and punishing people because they allegedly deserve it?
Those who believe that responsibility is not compatible with determin~
ism are called "incornpatibilists" and adopt different conclusions depend~
ing on their view of determinism. "Libertarian" incompatibilists believe
that determinism is not true for most action because we have metaphysical
libertarian freedom, and therefore we are responsible. "Hard determinist"
incompatibilists believe that determinism is true, deny that we have contracausal freedom, and conclude that responsibility is impossible. "Compati- !I
bilists" believe that determinism is true, deny that comra-causal freedom is ~
necessary for responsibility, and hold that responsibility is possible unde ,
the right conditions.
_
No analysis of this problem could conceivably persuade everyone.,.
There are no decisive, analytically incontrovertible arguments to resolve
the metaphysical question of the relation between determinism, libertar
ian free will, and responsibility. And the question is metaphysical, no
scientific. Indeed, the debate is so fraught that even theorists who ado
the same general approach to the metaphysical challenge substantially di
agree. Nevertheless, the view one adopts has profound consequences fC)
legal (and moral) rheory and practice.
Let us begin with hard determinist incompatibilism. (I have alrea
rejected libertarianism as empirically implausible. The rest of the discu
sion will therefore focus only on hard determinist incompatibilism, whi
is a coherent position held by many.) Incompatibilism does not try ei
to explain or to justify our responsibility concepts and practices. It s'
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ply assumes that genuine responsibility is metaphysically unjustified. For
example, a central incompatibilist argument is that people can be responsible only if they could have acted otherwise than they did, but if determinism is true, they could not have acted other than they did. This is sometimes
called the "principle of alternate possibilities." It has generated endless disputes between incompatibilists, who believe it is flatly inconsistent with
responsibility, and compatibilists, who believe that it is not inconsistent
wirh responsibiliry (Wallace, 1994). Based on rhis principle and similar
arguments, the incompatibilist claims that even if an internally coherent
account of responsibility and related practices can be given, it will be a
superficial basis for responsibility, which is only an illusion (Smilansky,
2000).

Incompatibilism based on any level of scientific cause, including G X E,
thus provides an external critique of responsibility. To see why, remember
that causal determinism "goes all the way down." It applies to all people, to
all events. Thus, if determinism is true and is inconsistent with responsibility, then no one can ever be really responsible for anything and responsibility attributions cannot properly justify further action. But Western theories
of moraliry and rhe law do hold some people responsible and excuse orhers, and the law responds accordingly. And when we do excuse, it is not
because there has been a little local determinism at work. For example,
young children are not considered fully responsible because they are incapable of recognizing and of properly weighing the right reasons for action
and forebearance, not because they are determined creatures but adults are
not. Determinism does not loosen its grip on us as we age.
The question, then, is whether as rational agents we must swallow
our pride, accept incompatibilism because it is so self-evidently true, and
somehow transform the legal system accordingly into a system that abandons desert and relies on a prediction and prevention model of social
control that is untethered from considerations of genuine responsibility.
Such systems have been proposed (e.g., Wootton, 1963), but they have
been criticized for their harsh and potentially inhumane implications that
profoundly rhrearen liberty and digniry (Hart, 1968; Lewis, 1953). Once
again, until scientific explanations, whether from G x E or others, convinces us that we are not acting agents, such a system is exceptionally
unlikely to gain assent.
Compatibilists, who agree with hard determinist incompatibilists that
determinism is true, have three basic answers to the incompatibilist challenge. First, they claim that responsibility attribution and related practices
are human activities constructed by us for good reason and that they need
nor conform to any ultimate metaphysical facts about genuine or "ultimate" responsibility. Indeed, some compatibilists deny that conforming to
ultimate metaphysical facts is even a coherent goal in this context. Second,
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comparibilism holds that our positive doctrines of responsibility are fully
consistent with determinism. Third, cornpatibilisrs believe that our respan.

sibility doctrines and practices 3te normatively desirable and consistent
with moral, legal, and political theories that we firmly embrace. The first
claim is theoretical; the third is primarily normative. There are very powee. ~
Eul arguments for the first and third claims (Leoman, 2006; Morse, 2004).
For our current purpose of determining whether criminal law has a free
will problem, the second claim is the most imporcanr.
Let us begin with the most general responsibility and excusing condi.
(ions. Recall tbat the capacity for rationality is the primary responsibility
criterion and its lack is the primary excusing condition. Now, it is simply a
fact about human beings that they have different capacities for rationality
in general and in specific contexts. Once again, for example, young children in general have less rational capacity than adults. It is also true that
rationality differences differentially affect agents' capacity to grasp and to
be guided by good reason. Differences in rational capacity and its effects
are real even if determinism is true. Compulsion is also an excusing condi- .~
tion, but it is simply another fact about human beings that some people act ~
in response to external or internal hard choice threats to which persons of J
reasonable firmness might yield and most people mOst of the time are nor in 1
such situations when they aCt. This is true even if determinism is true and J.
even if people could not have acted otherwise.
'
For a specific example, consider again the specific doctrines of crimi- '.
nal responsibility. Assume that the defendant has caused a prohibited
harm. Recall that responsibility requires that the defendant's behavior was
an action and performed with a requisite mental state. Now it is simply,
true that some bodily movements arc intentional and performed in a state'
of reasonably integrated consciousness and some are not. It is also true that
some defendants possess the requisite mental state and some do not. The
truth of determinism does not mean that actions are indistinguishable from ~
non actions or that people do not have different mental states when they act. '
These facts are true and make a perfectly rational legal difference, even ifw
determinism is true, Determinism is fully consistent with making distinc.tions among defendants about whether the elements of the crime charged~
can be proven.
t'
Now consider the defense of legal insanity, which was briefly address
above. Some people with mental disorder do not know right from wrong;
others do. Once again, legally differentiating these cases makes perfe ,...
sense according to dominant retributive and consequential theories of punt
ishment, A causal account, including from G x E in an appropriate c
can explain how these variations were caused to occur, but it does no
mean that they do not exist. Determinism is fully consistent with both th
presence and the absence of affirmative defenses. In sum, the legal criter'
..j
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used to identify which defendants are criminally responsible map onco real
behavioral differences that justify differential legal responses.
A causal determinist account would become inconsistent with our
responsibility practices only if our scientific investigations convinced us
that we are not the types of creatures the law takes us to be-conscious and
inrencional creatures who act for reasons. If it is true, for example, that we
are all automatons, then no one is acting and no one can be responsible for
action. I have termed this the" 0 Action Thesis" (Morse, 2003b, 2008).
Unlike the claimed inconsistency between determinism and responsibility,
which is a metaphysical question, this critique is empirical and in principle
capable of resolution. The conclusion that we are essentially automatons
would once again provide an external critique of responsibility and leave
nO rational room for legal decision making about genuine responsibility.
Although some scientists are gesturing in this direction (Wegner, 2002),
there is liule in current science that suggests that most people most of the
time are nor conscious and intentional creatures who act for reasons or
whose behavior can be guided by reason and incentives (Morse, 2008).
Compatibilism is consistent with our criminal responsibility doctrines
and practices, and there is no convincing theoretical reason to reject it. All
participants in the criminal justice system, including scientists who contribute to legal policymaking and decisions in individual cases, have good reason to embrace compatibilism. Scientists can comfortably continue to play
a crucial role in assisting the promotion of more rational criminal justice
without being distracted by the irrelevant issue of free will.

Causation Per Se Does Not Excuse:
The uFundamental Psycholegal Error"
The most persistent confusion about our actual doctrines and practices
concerning responsibility, which I have termed the "fundamental psycholegal error" {Morse, 1994), is the mistaken belief that causation, especially
by an abnormal cause, is per se an excusing condition. In brief, this error
relies on the same argument the incompatibilist makes, but without recognizing that it provides an external critique that muSt deny the possibility of
any responsibility. If the truth of determinism or universal causation is an
excusing condition, it applies not just in any particular legal context, such
as guilt or sentencing proceedings. It applies everywhere and always.
In a causally deterministic universe, all phenomena, including human
actions, are fully caused. If causation were per se an excusing condition,
no one could ever be responsible for anything. Thus, causation cannot be
an excusing condition in law and morals, both of which hold some people
responsible and excuse others. Although this is a simple and straightforward analytic point, the error persists (e.g., Kaye, 2005). If the causal chain
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were different, the ensuing action would be different. The question for law
is not whether behavior was caused. It is whether the legal criteria have
been satisfied. For purposes of assessing responsibility, it does not matter
whether the cause of the behavior in question is biological, psychological,
sociological, or some combination of the three. Adducing a genetic or neurophysiological cause does no more work than adducing an environmental
or interactive cause. The question is always whether the legal criteria for
nonresponsibiliry are met, however the behavior in question may have been
caused. A person who is mentally disordered and does not know right from
wrong will be excused from criminal responsibility whether his or her rationality impairment was primarily a product of faulty genetics, a neurotrans_
mitter defect, bad parenting, social stress, the alignment of the planets, or
some combination of the above, including G x E. The most important ques~
tion for criminal law is whether the legal excusing condition was present,
not how it was caused. Causal knowledge, if sufficiently precise, may help
establish whether or the likelihood that the legal criterion in question was
satisfied, but the person will be excused if the excusing condition is present,
even if we have no idea how the condition was caused.
For example, in Roper v. Simmons (2005) the Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether adolescents who committed capital murder when
they were 16 or 17 years old should be categorically excluded from being ~
sentenced to death. Advocates for abolition for this group of murderers )
argued that the demonstrated lack of complete myelination of the cortical •
I
neurons of the adolescent brain was reaso"n to believe that 16- and 17-year- ~
I
old murderers were insufficiently responsible to deserve capital punishment. '~
Rigorous behavioral studies had already confirmed the average differences
in rational capacity between adolescents and adults. The moral and constitutional implications of the data may be controversial, but the data are not.
At most, the neuroscientific evidence provided a partial causal explanation
of why the observed behavioral differences exist and thus some further "
evidence of the validity of the behavioral differences. The neuroscience was "
thus of only limited and indirect relevance to responsibility assessment, .
which is based on behavioral criteria concerning rationality. Diminished'l
responsibility follows from diminished rationality, however the latter is:
caused.
l
Finally, it follows logically that if full causation is not per se an excus"):
ing condition, 'then "partial causation'" also does not partially or fully,.;.
excuse the agent. Most of the time, we possess only imperfect, partial:
understanding of the causes of behavior. It is important to remember, how~
ever, that not possessing knowledge of the complete causal account of. '
person's behavior does not mean that a complete causal account does no
"
exist. Indeed, the notion that only some phenomena are caused or deter';
mined, but others are not, is incoherent. If this is a universally caused 0/j

,
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deterministic universe, all phenomena are caused, whether or not we have
knowledge of those causes.
In any case, discovering a partial normal or abnormal cause for behavior does not partially or completely excuse the agent unless that cause produces a genuine mitigating or excusing condition. For example, various
causes we discover may in part explain why an agent's rationality is fully or
partially impaired, but then it is the impairment of rationality, not causation, that is doing the excusing work.

Abnormal Causation Does Not Excuse Per Se
Abnormal causation, say, by mental disorder, also does not excuse per se,
but excuses only if it produces a genuine excusing condition, such as lack
of capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's actions. For example, a
person suffering from mental disorder that plays a causal role in the sufferer's behavior may nonetheless retain sufficient capacity for rationality to
be held fully responsible. A clinically hypomanic robber, for example, may
be especially energetic, mentally acute, and confident when the agent mugs.
Indeed, but for the clinical condition, the robber may not have mugged, but
there is no question about the agent's criminal responsibility in this case.
The robber is sufficiently rational to be held fully responsible.

Causation Is Not Compulsion
Causation is also not the equivalent of compulsion, even if some type of
normal or abnormal causal variable played a role in explaining the criminal
behavior in question. All behaviors are lawfully caused, but as philosopher
David Hume observed, the laws of nature are not coercive (Hume, 1978;
Scanlon, 2008). Not all behavior is the product of the external or internal
coercive conditions that meet moral and legal criteria for compulsion. If
causation were the equivalent of compulsion, everyone would always be
compelled and excused. For example, just because a person is predisposed
to antisocial activity by a G x E interaction, it does not mean that the
person was compelled to act. For another example, a delusional belief or
a hallucination may produce irrational reasons for action, but irrational
reasons are not per se more compelling than rational reasons. A person
who delusionally believes in the need to use deadly self-defense is no more
compelled to act than a nondelusional agent with the same honest belief.
The former may be excused because he or she is irrational, but compulsion
plays no mle in such cases. By the same logic, discovering part of the causation of behavior does not mean that the behavior was compelled to that
degree. Causation is not per se compulsion and "panial causation" is not
per se partial or complete compulsion.
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In conclusion, G x E will not affect responsibility analysis simply
because it is a cause of criminal behavior, even if it produces an immensely
predisposing cause. G x E will be relevant only if it helps prove or disprove
the existence of actual criminal law criteria. Let us therefore next examine
the specific relevance of G x E to those criteria.

G x E AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

The question of the relation of G x E to criminal responsibility reduces to
whether G x E evidence or data cast doubt on the elements of crimes, such
as action and mental states, or helps to establish (or cast doubt about) the
existence of a complete or partial affirmative defense. G x E causation, no
matter how powerful its explanatory role may be, will only negate respon.
sibility if it prevents a defendant from meeting the responsibility criteria of
the criminal law.
Using the example of the armed robber and the G x E interaction of
childhood abuse and a genetic MAOA deficiency with which this chapter
began, let us consider how this G x E affects responsibility. Although I wiU
concentrate on this specific example, the argument is fully generalizable to
any G x E that might causally contribute to criminal behavior.
The first criterion for responsibility is the "act" requirement. The
defendant's bodily movements that appear to have violated the law must
have been intentional and performed in a state of reasonably integrated
consciousness. In orher words, the agent must have acted. There is no evi- ~
dence in the G x E literature under consideration co suggest that the agents ~
thereby predisposed CO criminal behavior are nor acting when they commit
crimes. Their bodily movements are nor the equivalent of reflexes or spasms
and they are nOt performed in a dissociative state, such as sleepwalking-..
Unless some other explanation for lack of action is forthcoming, our armed:<
robber's behavior is clearly action even if G x E played a causal role.
/
A similar analysis applies to whether the defendant possessed the men"-;l'
tal state. the "mens rea," such as intention, knowledge, recklessness, 0 ~,
negligence, when the crime was committed. Again, nothing in the Iiterat l
of the G x E interaction in question suggests that this causal variable prer,
vents people from forming culpable mental states. Our armed robber, £ I.
example, surely had both the intent to steal using a weapon as a threat, an~~
ultimately, the intent to kill.
It is possible, however, that the effect of the interaction on a def
dam's mental capacities may interfere with the formation of some culpa
menta) states. For example, in some states, intentional killings that
performed after relatively cool, rational deliberation (so-called preme.
tated murder) are considered especially heinous and punished accordin '
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Although I know of no such data, suppose it could be demonstrated that
G x E made it extremely difficult to plan coolly and rationally for those
subject to it. In that case, the G x E evidence would help the law decide if
an intentional killer in fact premeditated. Notice, however, that it is lack of
premeditation, not G X E itself, which might explain why the killer is not
guilty of rhe aggravated degree of intentional homicide. If there were clear
behavioral evidence that the defendant did premeditate or was capable of
doing so despite the G X E-and, of course, there will be variation among
people with this G x E-then the defendant would be guilty of aggravated
homicide despite the evidence that G x E tends generally to make it difficult
to premeditate.
Another example would be recklessness. Recall that the criminal law's
definition of recklessness is conscious awareness that one's conduct is creating a high risk of a prohibited harm. It is a subjective mental state. Suppose
good evidence suggested that people with G x E are extremely poor estimators of the consequences of their conduct. If so, the G x E evidence would
be relevant and probative of whether a defendant actually was aware of the
risk created. And again, if the behavioral evidence suggested that the defendant was actually aware of the risk despite the G x E, say by adverting to it
in comments to accomplices, then G x E data would be trumped.
Consider negligence as a final example. Negligence is the failure to
be aware that one's conduct is creating a high risk of a prohibited harm in
situations in which a reasonable person should have been aware of the risk.
It is considered an "objective" mental state because we are comparing the
defendant to a hypothetical reasonable person. Suppose good evidence suggests that G x E makes it very difficult for those subject to it to behave as
reasonable people should. Although there is a good argument for negating
the presence of negligence in that case (Hart, 1968), the law is unforgiving about negligence. Everyone is held to the standard of the reasonable
person, including those people who may find it supremely difficult to meet
that standard through no fault of their own. Any mitigation based on the
defendant's deficiencies would only be considered at sentencing, which I
address in the next section.
In short, G x E is not likely to have much if any effect on the formation
of the act and mental state elements of the crime charged.
~
G x E is most likely to be relevant to the generic excusing conditions:
lack of rational capacity and lack of the capacity to control oneself. G x
E is not likely to be relevant to compulsion, criminal action compelled by
"do-it-or-else" threats using death or grievous bodily harm as the "or-else"
because these threats must be external. Lack of rational and of control
. capacity have technical legal doctrinal criteria, but for our purposes it is
sufficient to use the generic justifications for the doctrinal excuses, such as
infancy, legal insanity, and duress.

i
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Before we can answer whether G x E is relevant CO rational and control
capacity, it is necessary to explore what we mean by these capacities in a bit
more detail. There is no consensual definition of rationality in any of the
relevant disciplines, such as psychology, psychiatry, economics, and philosophy, that study this issue. Likewise, there is no unconrroversiallegal definition of rationality or of what kind and how much is required for responsibility in various legal contexts. Rationality for the law must be understood
according to some contingent, normative notion both of rationality and of
how much capability is required. For example, legal responsibility might
require the capability of understanding the reason for an applicable rule, as
well as understanding the rule's narrow behavior command and the Consequence for failure to comply. These are matters of moral, political and, ultimately, legal judgment about which reasonable people can and do differ.
These are normative issues about intentional behavior guided by reasons.
If one examines tbe various legal responsibility and competence doc·
trines that implicitly address rationality defects, however, one can infer
that the law's general definition is a congeries of abilities that closely track
an ordinary person's commonsense definition. For example, the agent must
be able to get the facts right, to know what he or she is doing, to be able
to respond reasonably to reasons and incentives in the context in question,
and the like. For example, one criterion for legal insanity is that the agent
does not know what he or she is doing. For another example, one criterion
for incompetence to stand criminal trial is that the defendant is unable to
understand the nature of the charges against him or her and the nature
of the trial proceedings that are about to occur. Deciding whether such
criteria are met requires an implicit, commonsensical folk psychological
definition of rationality of the sort we all use everyday to evaluate our own
conduct and the conduct of others.
It is much harder to provide a folk psychological account for the lack
of capacity to control oneself that is independent of a rationality defect.
People commonly use locutions like "I can't help myself," "I lost control of
myself," and like expressions, but what do they mean? When people "lose
control" and act badly, they are surely acting, but what is the folk psy·
chological process that suggests loss of control? Various models have been
used to try to inject content into the process, including a collapse of control problems into rationality defects (Morse, 2002), but none has seemed
conclusive. Moreover, at present we have no way of distinguishing action
that a person cannot control from action he or she simply did not control.
Such practical difficulties in part accounted for why both the American
Bar Association and the American Psychiatric Association recommended
abolishing "comrol" criteria for legal insanity in the mid-1980s.
The definitional problems persist. A recent, influential legal example is
the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Crane (2002), in which a criterion
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of "serious difficulty" controlling oneself was constitutionally required to
be proven before a state could civilly commit a so-called mentally abnormal
sexually violent predator. There was a withering dissent about the difficulty
of making this conclusory judgment and the courts that have since tried to
interpret this requirement have been unable to do more than simply repeat
the "serious difficulty" formula without further operationalization.
A current example from psychiatry is the conclusion that the drug
seeking and using of addicts is "compulsive." It is question begging to say
the addict cannOt control seeking and using because those behaviors are
signs of a disease. Actions are different from the purely mechanistic signs
and symptoms of most diseases, such as fevers or metastases. The lack of
ability to control action must be demonstrated independently (Fingarette
& Hasse, 1978). The psychiatric conclusion about compulsion is not based
on such an independent, operationalized measure. It is based on the commonsense conclusion that people who persist in behavior that often creates
ruinous medical, psychological, fiscal, personal, and legal problems and
who report feelings such as craving must not have good control over their
drug-related behavior. Although there is reason to question this conclusion,
especially in its strongest form (Heyman, 2009), no folk psychological process has been specified even if we do accept it.
In short. adequately defining control capacity is a problem for criminal
law that science has not yet solved. Nonetheless, the ensuing discussion will
assume for the sake of argument that we can make sense of control problems. Like the rationality criterion for responsibility, the degree of control
the law will require is a normative matter that can vary from one legal
context to another.
To be relevant to legal excuses, G x E data will have to be translated
into the law's folk psychological definitions of rational capacity and control
capacity. The G x E studies in question were not clinical or thick phenomenological descriptions of the high-risk subjects. For the sake of general
argument, however, let us assume a number of folk psychological variables
that might in part account for the high rates of offending among these subjects. Nothing turns on whether these are the correct variables because the
argument that will be made is general and would apply to whatever variables are doing the explanatory work. Consequently, let uS simply assume
that the subjects may have been highly sensation seeking, impulsive, or
suffering from poor judgment.
These types of folk psychological variables are relevant to commonsense
notions of rational and control capacity. Moreover. science can help operationalize and measure such variables. For example, the amicus ("friend of
the court") briefs of the American Psychological Association in the Roper
v. Simmon.s (2005) case and in the recently decided Supreme Court case
concerning the constitutionality of sentencing juvenile offenders to life in
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prison without the possibility of parole (jLWOPl for nonhomicide crimes
Graham v. Florida (2010), 3re replete with studies of the decision-making•
abilities and ocher psychological variables that 3re relevant co whether ado.
lescenrs as a class are on average less responsible than adults because they
have less rational capacity. Whether the differences between adolescencs
and adults are sufficiently large in quantity and quality to warrant differential treatment is, of course, a normative moral and legal question that
science cannot answer, but the data are surely relevant to the legal decision
that must be made.
The same type of analysis applies to G x E offenders, including our
armed robber. Assuming that the folk psychological process G x E produces adversely affects rational and concrol capacities, the question will
be whether the adverse effects are sufficiently large to warrant excuse or
mitigation for criminal conduct. Treated as a general matter of legal policy,
a question would be whether the effects are so marked that we should mitigate the culpability of G x E offenders as a class and forego individualized
evaluation on a case·by·case basis. The law generally disfavors such general
as opposed to individualized decision making, although it has been willing
to prohibit the capital punishment of murderers from the reasonably welldelineated classes of people with retardation (Atkins v. Virginia, 2003) and
of killers who were 16 or 17 years old at the time of the capital crime
(Roper v. Simmons, 2005).
Assuming that G x E does have psychological effects that bear on
responsibility, it is virtually certain that G x E offenders would have their
culpability assessed individually through doctrinal excuses or at sentenc· ,
ing. Recall that the offender's actual behavior will be more probative than .l
the group data. If the offender's history and conduct at the time of the
crime indicate no substamial defects, the group data will be of little avail. ~
Actions speak louder than G x E. If the offender's capacities are unclear, .·jl
however, the group data might help.
Unfortunately for G x E offenders, no general excusing condition seems
to apply. The insanity defense may seem like the strongest opportunity, but
G x E offenders will nOt qualify for the insanity defense unless they also suffer from a major mental disorder that causes them to lose touch with reality.
This is required by many jurisdictions and in practice suffering from gross
loss of contact with reality is necessary to succeed with an insanity defense
even if the legal rule does not specify that the disorder must have psychotic
features. No other general excusing condition is even remotely applicable.
Criminal law has few mitigating doctrines that are considered at trial to
which rhe folk psychological processes G x E produces would apply. 1have
proposed that criminal law should adopt a generic "partial responsibility":
doctrine based on diminished rationality that would be considered at trial ..
and that would mitigate the offender's degree of conviction and punish- :
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ment if the claim were successful (Morse, 2003a). Alas, no jurisdiction has
adopted or is even considering this proposal. Again, such factors may be
considered at sentencing, which I consider in the next section.
The arguments that I have been making about the G x E that Caspi
and colleagues (2002) discovered are fully generalizable to any future G x
E discoveries. The evidence would have to be relevant to the criminal law's
folk psychological criteria for whether the defendant acted, whether he or
she possessed the mental state required by the definition of the crime, and
whether an excusing condition, such as lack of rational or control capacity,
is established. Whether G x E played a causal role in explaining the criminal behavior is legally irrelevant unless one falls prey to the "fundamental
psycholegal error" of thinking that causation is an excuse. This conclusion applies even in the unlikely event that every person subject to the G
x E in question commits a crime. A genuine excusing or mitigating condition would still have to be established to defeat the allegation of criminal
responsibility. After all, in a lawful causal world, all human behavior is
fully explained by the causal background that produced it. If causes were
excuses, no one would be responsible. That is not the legal and moral world
we inhabit and it is not likely to be.
In short, G x E will seldom play much role in guilt determinations,
but it ma~ playa more extensive role in sentencing and parole decisions, to
which I now turn.

G x E AND SENTENCING
Questions concerning mitigation and potential future dangerousness are
primarily the province of sentencing decisions. The question at sentencing
is how G x E evidence would be relevant to sentencing criteria. This section
begins br considering sentencing practices generally, and then turns to how
G x E might be relevant.
In most U.S. jurisdictions, there is a range of permissible sentence for
each crime and the sentencing judge has virtually complete discretion co
impose any sentence within that range or to place the defendant on probation. A minority of jurisdictions, including the federal system, have guidelines that constrain judicial discretion, but even in such constrained systems judges have some discretion about the sentence to be imposed. Thus,
sentencing judges can consider mitigating and aggravating factors not considered at trial to adjust the offender's sentence up or down within the
statutorily permitted range of sentence for the crime. Sentencing criteria
in noncapital cases are undertheorized and often not specified, thus leaving judges unguided discretion. Capital punishment must be decided by a
jury (Rillg v. Arizona, 2002), and there are typically statutory aggravating
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and mitigating factors the jury must consider. In addition, beginning with
Lockett v. Ohio (1978), the Supreme Coun made clear in many decisions
that the defendant facing capital punishment may present virtually any evi.
deoce that could conceivably he mitigating even if the statutory mitigating
factors do not include the factor the evidence supports.
Consider mitigation first. Sentencing practices are often considerably
less clear than the criteria for guilt. For example, the erroneous "causal theory of excuse" appears to he taken into account for mitigation. The rationale seems to he that understanding the causes of the defendant's behavior
somehow reduces responsibility per se. The Italian judge's reduction of the
defendant's sentence on the ground that the defendant was predisposed to
violence when stressed suggests that the judge was implicitly adopting this
rationale. On the other hand, the evidence introduced at sentencing may
suggest that mitigation is warranted because the defendant suffered from
substantial rationality or control deficits, even if they were not sufficiently
substantial to rise to the level of a full legal excuse. Such a claim would be
entirely supported by retributive and perhaps consequential justifications
for punishment that we firmly embrace. Even if the defendant was criminally responsible, he or she may deserve a lesser sentence if he or she was
nOt fully rational at the time of the crime.
A central aggravating factor is the predicted future dangerous conduct
of the defendant, which is considered not only at sentencing itself, but also
for parole decisions. In capital sentencing statutes, future dangerousness
is often expressed by criteria based on past behavior, such as prior convictions, and sometimes it is expressed directly. This ground for aggravation
or for denial of parole is purely consequential-the protection of the public.
Of course, by the same logic, defendants who are less predictably dangerous
should receive lesser sentences on consequential grounds. The major practical issue is determining how accurately we can predict future dangerous
conduct and how much contribution to such accuracy evidence such as G x
E might contribute. Current law is accepting of predictions based on weak
evidence (e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 1983), but well-validated prediction factors have the potential to make prediction decisions more rational and just.
Other aggravating factors include the defendant's failure to show remorse,
and committing the crime in a particularly dangerous or cruel manner
(which is a culpability factor as well as an indication of dangerousness).
Note one final feature of using prediction of future dangerousness as
an aggravating factor. It appears to deny the offender's agency and dignity by suggesting that the offender cannot be guided adequately by reason
(Duff, 2007). This may be justified by consequential justifications and there
is no problem concerning retribution as long as the sentence remains within
the statutorily authorized range, but it is nonetheless an undesirable aspect
of prediction practices concerning responsible agents.
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Now let us consider the relation of G x E to this brief account of sentencing, returning to our armed robber for final consideration. There is
little dispute that people with his G x E are highly predisposed to committing criminal or otherwise antisocial acts. To the extent that the judge or
jury in a capital case accepts the "causal theory of mitigation," the sentence
may be reduced despite any clear rationale for doing so. Another theory
might also be lurking to support mitigation, although it depends on only
the abuse part of the interaction. The rationale is that the hard life suffered
by the defendant has been "payment in advance" (Klein, 1990) or sufficient previous suffering that should reduce the amount of suffering that
should be imposed now. This theory has no legal basis, but it may playa
role psychologically. [n any case, note that this theory has little to do with
the G x E specifically. It is possible, however, that the same psychological
characteristics G x E produces that predispose the armed robber to crime
are rationality or control defects. If so, there will be good theoretical reason
to mitigate the armed robber's sentence.
Now let us turn to how G x E might be relevant to sentencing aggravation, parole, or commitment decisions. The very same evidence of G x E
predisposing the armed robber to future criminal behavior would certainly
be considered a risk factor for future criminality, and thus would support
a longer sentence and denial of parole. The issue would be the practical
one of accurately assessing how much G x E predisposes to future criminal
behavior. Also, if this G x E were linked not only to future dangerousness,
but also to lack of remorse, then it might be further confirmation of behavioral indications that this defendant lacked remorse.
In brief, G x E evidence can be a knife that cuts both ways, supporting
both mitigation and aggravation.

G X E FOR CRIMINAL LAW ISSUES
OTHER THAN RESPONSIBILITY AND SENTENCING

Understanding the causes of criminal behavior may be vitally useful within
and without the criminal justice system to questions concerning rehabilitation and prevention. For example, outside the criminal justice system, it
may be useful for establishing policies and programs that will reduce the
risk of antisocial behavior. Fully discussing these uses raises complex issues
and would require a chapter in itself, but I will gesture at them in this section.
For many reasons, including issues of retributive and distributive justice and civil liberties, rehabilitation is no longer considered a prime goal
of the criminal justice system and it is of diminished importance within the
delinquency jurisdiction of juvenile justice and especially when juveniles
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who commit crimes are tried as adults. Nonetheless, if causal knowledge
could help create effective, cost-benefit justified rehabilitation methods for
some prisoners, there would be impetus to use them because recidivism
imposes major costs on our society. Whether a particular G x E that predisposes people to criminal offending is amenable to specific rehabilitation
methods derived from that causal knowledge is of course an open empirical
question that good research can help answer. Whether an apparently effective intervention is cost-benefit justified is of course a normative moral,
political, and legal question that science cannot decide.
Causal G x E knowledge may also be the key to prophylactic policies
and programs that would be established outside the criminal justice system.
Yet again, whether specific policies and programs would be effective and
cost-benefit justified are open empirical and normative questions. There
are risks associated with identifying classes of people and individuals as "at
risk" for criminal behavior. Labeling effects, interventions that are unnecessary and often counterproductive for many recipients, and privacy issues
are examples of the potential negative effects of such policies and programs.
Let us hope, however, that advancing causal knowledge, whether from G
x E or other fields, does point the way to successful preventive intervention
and that the potential negative effects could be minimized.
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